In this paper, I study the application of phylogenetic analysis in evolutionary archaeology. I show how transfer of this apparently general analytic tool is affected by salient differences in disciplinary context. One is that archaeologists, unlike many biologists, do not regard cladistics as a tool for classification, but are primarily interested in explanation. The other is that explanation is traditionally sought in terms of individual-level rather than population-level mechanisms. The latter disciplinary difference creates an ambiguity in the application and interpretation of phylogenetic analyses. Moreover, I argue that, while archaeologists have claimed that "cladistics is useful for reconstructing artefact phylogenies" (O'Brien et al. 2001) , these reconstructions only contribute minimally to the explanatory research agenda of evolutionary archaeology.
Phylogenetic analysis and explanation in evolutionary archaeology
Darwinizing culture: global and local revolutions
Evolutionary theory is outgrowing its natural habitat. Many researchers outside biology frame their questions and results in evolutionary terms, and propose counterparts to mechanisms and entities that are central to our understanding of the organic world. Thus, historians and economists discuss how introducing a genotypephenotype distinction helps to describe technological change (e.g., Ziman 2000) and engineers claim that solutions of design problems may evolve by natural selection (e.g., Bentley 1999 ).
This 'second Darwinian revolution' has not escaped philosophical scrutiny.
Philosophers of science have examined, for instance, which explanatory role could conceivably be played by evolutionary mechanisms with respect to social processes (Sober 1991) or the spread of religious ideas (Sterelny 2006) . The question that drives most of this work is whether there is, given the existence and success of alternative accounts, any explanatory work done by or left to do for evolutionary accounts of culture and technology. The critical focus is on general theories of cultural evolution, such as dual-inheritance theory or memetics (see Laland and Brown 2002 for a useful survey).
Not all extensions of Darwinism takes this global form. Much consists of selective applications, to specific disciplinary problems, of tools or techniques taken from evolutionary biology. Research papers in evolutionary economics, engineering and archaeology rarely mention general frameworks such as dual-inheritance theory and only occasionally discuss the possibilities of defining suitably general evolutionary concepts. Instead, the results reported are gained by applying specific tools and techniques. Economists have, for example, adopted Lotka-Volterra models to study how technological change affects competition between firms (e.g., Saviotti 1995); and archaeologists and anthropologists have recently started using phylogenetic analysis to reconstruct tool traditions. The latter efforts will be the subject of this paper.
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Applications of evolutionary tools outside biology raise methodological problems which have been largely ignored by philosophers of science. Critical responses are instead brought forward locally, by researchers within the discipline who favour a non-evolutionary approach. One objection is found throughout the literature, although the details vary with the evolutionary tool being questioned.
Critics maintain that culture and technology essentially involve human beliefs and intentions. From this, they conclude that evolutionary tools, such as replicator dynamics or phylogenetic reconstruction, structurally misrepresent the phenomena. A standard response is to point out that, although methodological problems may arise in applying evolutionary tools to cultural phenomena, the problems are largely the same as those in biology. Cultural evolution is presented as 'business-as-usual' from a biological perspective: not less difficult, but also not less appropriate to the domain.
In this paper, I develop another perspective on the application of evolutionary tools to Darwinize culture. Instead of focussing on structural (dis-)similarity, I
examine how the change of disciplinary context affects the relevance of evolutionary tools. This leads to a detailed appreciation of the difficulties in transferring one item in the evolutionary toolkit from the organic to the artificial world. I first describe phylogenetic techniques and their application in archaeology (section 2). Although phylogenetic reconstructions are strictly speaking neutral tools to analyse similarity relations between items, I go on to show that the relevance conditions set by the disciplinary context differentiate applications of these tools in archaeology from those in biology. In archaeology, these reconstructions are supposed to contribute to a primarily explanatory project (section 3), which conceals an important ambiguity regarding the type of explanation sought -and to which, given our present knowledge of (evolutionary) mechanisms underlying design and use practices, the construction of tool trees contributes little (section 4). I also offer suggestions regarding a productive research agenda and the role of phylogenetic reconstructions therein. 4
Trees of tools: How phylogenetics came to archaeology
Before describing the use of phylogenetic analyses in archaeology, some words about the technique in general. One of Darwin's central insights was that of the common ancestry of (all of) life. All biological species are related by sharing, somewhere in their part, common ancestral species. The historical relations within any set of species can therefore be represented by a branching, tree-like structure, from the ancestor they all share at the root to the topmost branching points at which one finds (more recent) ancestors shared by only two species. A sample phylogenetic tree, for five species, is given in Figure 1 .
All species share a common ancestor (F * ) and species A and B share a more recent common ancestor (G * )
than species A and D (H * ).
Various techniques exist for reconstructing phylogenetic trees. Most are based on morphological characteristics of the species studied, 1 typically called "states" of "characters". States can be discrete or continuous; in practice, continuous states are often turned into discrete ones by introducing cut-off points. Sample characters are feeding habits (with states "carnivorous", "herbivorous" and "omnivorous") or adult wingspan (with continuous states and a cut-off point at one metre). Starting from these characteristics, a number of methods have been developed to infer phylogenies, most of which are implemented in software packages. A popular choice, the most popular among archaeologists, is the "maximum parsimony" method, implemented in PAUP (Swofford 2002) . This reconstructs the tree by finding the minimum number of evolutionary events that can account for the observed characteristics -roughly Figure 1 . A sample phylogenetic tree speaking, it minimises the total number of character-state changes in the tree. Another choice is that of an outgroup, a species that is phylogenetically related to, but not included among, the set of species involved. This choice converts a network of similarities into a rooted tree, and is non-trivial because it requires prior knowledge of some phylogenetic relations.
On the basis of these choices, phylogenetic analysis not only determines relations of common ancestry, but also identifies the character states of hypothetical common ancestors; in fact, the former is achieved by the latter. Thus, the result looks conspicuously like a family tree in which portraits are proposed for unknown It is difficult to assess independently the outcome of phylogenetic analyses: data are typically scarce, and relations of ancestry are not directly observable. One thing that distinguishes parsimony-based cladograms from systematically generated historical narratives is that there are two measures of quality: the 'consistency' and 'retention' indexes of the cladogram. These numbers measure how well the data fit the branching structure 'imposed' on it in phylogenetic analysis; 3 the measured quantity is sometimes described as the strength of the phylogenetic signal in the data set. The more homoplasies are needed to reconstruct the relations of common ancestry between the items, the lower the signal and the indexes.
Parsimony methods for phylogenetic reconstructions are well-established in systematic biology, and have also been applied in other disciplines, like linguistics and archaeology. In archaeology, the application takes the shape of reconstructing 'tool traditions', lineages of artefacts that are roughly functionally equivalent. anthropologists. Their objections fit the template described above. In particular, it has been pointed out that the tree of technology cannot have the neat branching structure of the tree of life. Rather, it should show many intersections of lineages due to blending or reticulation of cultural/tool traditions. One cause of this blending would be "pervasive theft of ideas", as one critic, Niles Eldredge (introduction to Lipo et al. 2006: xvi) , has put it: human beings, including artisans, imitate each other easily and 4 Another choice is to focus on the characters of artefacts instead of those of, e.g., use practices or larger cultural units. This is controversial, also among evolutionary archaeologists. Advocates of artefact phylogenetics defend their approach with an "as-innature" argument; in this case, a comparison of the quality of phylogenetic analyses in systematic biology and those in anthropology and archaeology ).
The consistency and retention indexes for 'cultural' cladograms lie in the same range as those in nature, meaning that cladistic techniques are as appropriate to cultural phenomena as they are to biological species: cladistics misrepresents the tree of technology as much (or little) as it misrepresents the tree of life. Since archaeologists face the same methodological choices as systematic biologists, there is structural and methodological similarity between cultural and natural evolution.
A remarkable illustration of the stalemate to which this focus on structural (dis-) similarities has led is the application of phylogenetic techniques to two types of musical instruments (Tëmkin and Eldredge 2007) . This application is intended to show how a branching structure misrepresents the actual history of these instruments, which has a much more reticulated structure. Advocates of artefact phylogenetics have welcomed this intended reductio as a result; they emphasise that the retention index of, for instance, the Baltic psaltery cladogram lies just below the 'cultural average' -which is equal to the biological average. A non-partisan presentation mentions spearheads, textiles and musical instruments on a par, as items for which "phylogenetic trees have been constructed" (Venditti and Pagel 2008) .
Clades in classification and explanation
Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that tool trees are indeed structurally similar to the tree of life, and in reconstructing the former one faces the same methodological choices and dilemmas as in reconstructing the latter. This equivalence would leave room for another type of criticism. To put it metaphorically: the consistency and retention 'scores' of trees of tools and of life may be the same -but are archaeologists and biologists playing the same game in applying cladistics? In this section and the next, I show how the application of cladistic techniques in archaeology is affected by its disciplinary context, which is different from that in biology.
One difference concerns the broader aim of phylogenetic analyses -the reason why researchers in a discipline are interested in trees. In biology, the relevance of 8 cladistics lies in large part in their use for systematics, i.e., for the correct classification of living items into groups. Phylogenetic analyses contribute directly to determining the historical relations between these groups, which are of obvious importance in their classification and, arguably, in their nomenclature. Indeed, "cladistics" not only indicates a popular type of (parsimony-based) phylogenetic analysis, but also an approach to the classification of living items -showing a close association between the analysis and its expected relevance. Consequently, many applications of and discussions regarding the analyses concern revisions of traditional classifications (e.g., Mayr 1981; Hull 1988) . One example is the classification of birds and various dinosaur species. Cladistics has been used to determine historical relations between these species, which has contributed significantly to the ongoing debate about the evolution of birds from dinosaur-like, lizard-like or other ancestral species.
Phylogenetic analyses are not exclusively applied for classification. As the origin-of-birds example shows, issues of classification are connected to explanations, e.g., of the evolutionary "events" identified in the phylogenetic analysis. Another application is in phylogenetic comparative methods (e.g., Harvey and Pagel 1991), which are used to test correlations for independence of data -and thus to evaluate hypotheses about the adaptation of species to their environment or the co-evolution of traits.
However, phylogenetic analyses would be relevant to biology even if they would contribute only minimally to explanatory projects. Archaeologists are, by contrast, uninterested in classification. Most regard any system of distinguishing artefact kinds -or, more generally, cultural kinds -as "conventional" or interestdependent. As an influential textbook puts it: "Types, assemblages and cultures are all artificial constructs designed to put order into disordered evidence (...) [D]ifferent classifications are needed for the different kinds of questions we want to ask" (Renfrew and Bahn 2004: 118 The concern with explanation is also evident in descriptions of the results of artefact cladistics, e.g., in the following quote:
"We use cladistics because of its unique ability ... to lay out sequences of character-state changes. (...) The ultimate goal is to explain why side notching was preferred over other hafting techniques" (Darwent and O'Brien 2006: 185) The association with classification is therefore exchanged for a focus on explanation.
This raises the question, however, how phylogenetic reconstructions contribute to explanations -and to which explanations they contribute.
Two tales of tools, but not with trees
In In Reconstructing the Past, Elliott Sober analyses a particular kind of explanation that apparently underwrites this two-step process, but also shows some general difficulties in taking the second step. Sober (1988, p.133) Archaeologists are aware that explanations cannot be read off directly from cladograms and that finding explanations is difficult: the full description of the second step in the source quoted above is "a truly grueling and often fruitless job" (O'Brien and Lyman 2000: 20; emphasis added). Still, the need for mechanisms raises two questions about the explanatory project envisaged. First, which mechanisms are available, in terms of background knowledge, to explain the structure of artefact lineages? Secondly, given the need for and perhaps choice of mechanisms, is constructing the cladogram independent from explaining it?
In this section, I argue for three critical claims: that archaeologists make different and implicit choices regarding the level of explanation; that these choices affect phylogenetic reconstructions, so that the explanatory step cannot be neatly separated from the reconstructive step; and that, on either of the two choices regarding mechanism, phylogenetic analyses contribute little or nothing to the explanatory project of (evolutionary) archaeology.
First, the ambiguity. Evolutionary archaeologists may and do seek explanatory mechanisms at two different levels. On the one hand, they can appeal to broad knowledge bases from everyday life and more systematic inquiries, including anthropological case studies, experimental archaeology and innovation studies. These sources provide information about the transmission and change of technological knowledge and artefacts, including training and selective communication; imitation and theft of ideas; independent invention and guided variation; and modularity of design problems and solutions. In most real-life cases, combinations of these mechanisms will operate, creating an overwhelming variety of possible explanatory mechanisms. These mechanisms focus on decisions made by individual users and designers of artefacts, against a social background. Moreover, the artefacts are mostly individual items or kinds with few members -archaeologists do not describe an era of mass-production. 9 Pitched at this level, the efforts of archaeologists would resemble the application of cladistic techniques to the genealogy of copied texts such as The Canterbury Tales or chain letters (e.g., Spencer et al. 2004 ). The resulting textualtradition trees feature individual texts and may be interpreted in terms of explanatory mechanisms such as transcription errors, made by individual scribes, and "deliberate contamination" from other texts than the copied one.
Evolutionary theory offers another set of mechanisms, such as natural selection and drift. These mechanisms, which operate on the population level, should be distinguished from various "selective forces" operating on the individual level. One consequence of this choice is that the resulting reconstruction or explanation is not evolutionary, because it is not populational. This does not discredit the explanations -many respectable historical explanations are not populational or Darwinist -but it does make it misleading to present the explanatory project as evolutionary archaeology.
A more principled problem is that an overwhelming variety of mechanisms operates on the level of individual artefacts, many or all of which involve human intentions. Even setting aside the specific complexities of validating intentional explanations, explanatory hypotheses are vastly underdetermined by the available evidence. The problem with archaeological explanations is not that few hypotheses fit the (scant) facts, but that there is a "superabundance" (Renfrew and Bahn 2004, p.469) , with no principled way to prefer one explanation over the other.
Do cladograms contribute to solving this difficulty? One might think they do.
After all, they make a principled distinction between homologies and homoplasies.
This means that some similarities are unlikely to be the result of independent invention, like homologies in biology are not cases of convergent evolution. Yet an abundance of explanatory mechanisms is left: homologies could be explained by strong material constraints on design, fixed (but false) technological knowledge about these constraints, strict master-apprentice relations, unchanging user preferences, to name but a few; likewise, homoplasies can be the result of -among other thingsprestige or conformity bias among cultures, independent invention, and dependence between traits. Moreover, for any change in character state, one can appeal to changes in either design or use practices.
One could counter that excluding one of many mechanisms would improve the explanatory situation. However, cladistic techniques might also overlook or downplay the importance of some mechanisms, causing loss of information. Here, on the individual level, the structural-misrepresentation objection appears to have some bite after all. Background knowledge tells us that, for instance, theft of ideas and One might therefore seek strength in numbers, i.e., pitch explanations at the population level. Indeed, the promise made by evolutionary archaeologists (quoted in section 3) seems to be that the abundance of individual-level mechanisms may be replaced with the population-level mechanisms of evolutionary theory.
To move to the population level, the items that are subjected to phylogenetic analysis should be artefact types rather than individual tokens. Suppose that this choice, non-standard in archaeology, could be made in some uncontroversial manner.
Even then, given the present state of our knowledge, the phylogenetic reconstruction would contribute little to population-level archaeological explanations. The reason is that one cannot simply assume or postulate that populations of material artefacts evolve by natural selection. The seminal work on dual-inheritance models of human cultural evolution by Boyd and Richerson (1985) shows that some cultural items, such as child-bearing practices, may evolve by natural selection, even without genetic replication mechanisms, under specific conditions. Their results carefully distinguish selective forces such as conformity bias, operating on (the adoption of) individual cultural items, from natural selection, which operates on a population level.
12 Tëmkin and Eldredge (2007) suggest that their reconstruction of instrument traditions is a demonstration of inaccuracy, not just of the reticulated shape of the tree of technology. However, they conclude the former from the latter: low phylogenetic signal in the data is taken as an indication that cladistic techniques misrepresent the true historical relations. This need not be the case, since the (many) homoplasies in a low-CI cladogram could be taken to represent horizontal transmission. The question is rather whether similarities known to be due to horizontal transmission are correctly reconstructed as homoplasies. The more consistent accuracy tests in (Eerkens et al. 2006 ) likewise focus on how simplified transmission systems lower consistency indexes to that obtained for a random data set. But again, inaccuracies might also arise for acceptable consistency indexes, because of specific individual-level mechanisms at work in the design and use of technology. There have as yet been no attempts at this modelling by evolutionary archaeologists. 13 My point is not that these models cannot be constructed, or that their results will be negative. Rather, it is that without these models (or others like them), it cannot be said which mechanisms are responsible for the historical relations between artefact types which would be 'revealed' by a population-level phylogenetic reconstruction. Given the availability of software packages like PAUP, it is possible to generate such a reconstruction, which has every appearance of a result in
archaeology. Yet explaining the shape of the cladogram is not be a gruelling job, as in the individual-level case, but -at least at present -a shot in the dark.
Conclusions
Constructing cladograms from morphological data seems a discipline-neutral operation. Applicability results in archaeology have indeed shown that parsimonybased methods (and the software in which it is implemented) travel unscathed from biology to the study of technical artefacts. I have argued, however, that the resulting reconstructions of phylogenetic traditions do not travel as well; a meaningful result in one disciplinary context may be of dubious value in another, although it has been gained by applying the same method. Disciplinary context affects phylogenetic analyses of tool traditions in several ways. First, they are supposed to contribute to explanation of the archaeological record rather than classification, since the latter is thought to be a matter of prior stipulation. Second, there is an unresolved, implicit ambiguity in the explanations sought -individual-level or population-level -which affects both the construction of cladograms and their interpretation. Third, on either explanatory level, cladograms contribute little to outstanding questions: on the individual level, few relevant mechanisms can be excluded from consideration on the basis of phylogenetic reconstructions, and the operation of some mechanisms may be systematically overlooked; on the population level, interpreting cladograms is mere speculation as long as it has not been established which mechanisms operate on classes of artefacts.
These conclusions are critical about existing work on tool traditions. It does,
however, identify what I regard as some real research challenges and choices faced by evolutionary archaeology. Moreover, the conclusions do not entail that phylogenetic
analysis cannot be applied successfully and productively outside of biology. Such applications may, for instance, be limited to extensions of the comparative method to studies of cultural evolution; there, reconstructions of tool traditions do not contribute directly to explanations, but they are relevant for checking dependencies in data sets and assessing the strength of correlations.
Another suggestion concerns the method for phylogenetic reconstruction. The current preference for parsimony-based methods, combined with the idea that cladograms can be constructed before they are interpreted, perhaps needs to be reconsidered. Alternatives are approaches based on Bayesianism, or on modelselection approaches to statistical inference. These methods are, to a large extent, ordinally equivalent to parsimony, i.e., they generate the same reconstructions (Sober 2008, Ch.4) . Generating reconstructions, however, may be unproductive in archaeology, given the superabundance of mechanisms. Instead, one might try to test explanatory hypotheses by means of phylogenetic analyses. This reverses the two-step procedure proposed by evolutionary archaeologists and aligns with work in biology, in which the relevance of phylogenetic analysis for hypothesis testing was shown (e.g., Huelsenbeck and Rannala 1997; Johnson and Omland 2004) . It would be worthwhile to examine whether this relevance can be extended to archaeology, along with the analytic methods used.
